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DEFINING TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION AFTER
BOWEN V MASSACHUSETTS
Michael F Noone, Jr.
Urban A. Lester**
Such writ did not use to be made of old time .... But all was
once other than it is now, and will be other again. New King, new
law, new Justices, new masters .... 1
Various reasons have been offered to explain why the English doctrine of
sovereign immunity came to be applied in the United States.' Congress
gradually modified the doctrine, as it applied to claims not sounding in tort,
in a series of Court of Claims Acts3 initiated in 1855 and culminating in the
Tucker Act of 1887 (Tucker Act or Act).4 The Tucker Act granted United
States circuit and district courts concurrent jurisdiction over small claims
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1. 31 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II 87 (1311-12) (Scldeon Society ed. 1915).
2. H. STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILrrY 8-11 (1953). Professor Street gives three
possible explanations for the adoption and survival of sovereign immunity in the United States:
(1) the United States received the doctrine with the rest of the English common law; (2) the
doctrine survived due to the financial instability of infant American states, and (3) logically,
there could be no legal right against the power that created the laws. Id. at 8-9. See generally
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officer" Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1963) (discussing the English law of sovereign immunity and its applicability in American
law).
3. Act of February 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat.
765 (allowing executive review of judgments), repealed by Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14
Stat. 9; Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 2, 15 Stat. 75 (providing for Court of Claims appeals to
the United States Supreme Court).
4. The Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). Concurrent jurisdiction of the district court is codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
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defined as those not in excess of $10,000.' The system worked well for over
a century, and circuit courts regularly struck down efforts by district court
plaintiffs to breach the "Little Tucker Act's" $10,000 barrier.6 In 1988,
however, the United States Supreme Court held in Bowen v. Massachusetts
7
that a state's suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services seek-
ing the release of millions of dollars in Medicaid funds could be brought in
district court. The Bowen majority reasoned that it was not a suit under the
Tucker Act', but fell instead within the general waiver of sovereign immu-
nity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9
Likewise, appeals from such district court judgments would not fall within
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit,1 0 rather, they would be within the jurisdiction of the regional circuit
courts of appeals."
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988). See also infra note 29 (discussing the historical devel-
opment of the $10,000 jurisdictional limit in the district court).
6. See, e.g., Gower v. Lehman, 799 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's monetary claim for back pay because it was in
excess of $10,000); Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 646 F.2d 399, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction for claims greater than $10,000); Mathis v. Laird,
483 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1973) (same); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912,
914 (2d Cir. 1960) (same); Sutcliffe Storage & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d 849,
951 (1st Cir. 1947) (same); Hill v. United States, 40 F. 441 (1889) (jurisdiction only conferred
on circuit court by waiving damages in excess of $10,000); Andrews v. Webb, 685 F. Supp.
579, 580 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1988) (exclusive Claims Court jurisdiction for claims greater than
$10,000).
7. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
8. Id. at 908.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
10. Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982
to "establish doctrinal uniformity." Cihlar, An Overview of Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appealsfor the Federal Circuit, in HANDBOOK ON PRACTICE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
CLAIMS COURT AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
197-98 (1986). See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982);
S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (noting that a motivating concern of Congress
in creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was the special need for nation-wide
uniformity in suits against the Federal Government); Schwartz, Two New Federal Courts, 68
A.B.A. J. 1091 (1982).
11. See Cihlar, supra note 10, at 197-220.
In 1988, Congress amended the judicial code to allow for appeals from district courts to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on orders denying or allowing transfers
of cases to the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(d)(4)(A)
(Supp. 1990). Because Congress wanted to "ensure uniform adjudication of Tucker Act issues
in a single forum," it gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over these appeals.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4652 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 6012.
One of the first cases to use the new procedure was Mitchell v. United States, 930 F.2d 893
(Fed. Cir. 1990). Mitchell involved a National Guardsman's back pay claim. The Federal
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Three years have passed since the Bowen decision and, while there is still
no agreement as to whether the decision was a radical avulsion in traditional
jurisprudence, 2 the decision calls for a reassessment of the Tucker Act's
provisions limiting those suits which can be brought in district courts. This
Article is a contribution to that reassessment, attempting to find in Bowen
those peculiar characteristics which will enable lawyers and jurists to discern
whether a suit which seeks a money judgment against the United States im-
plicates the Tucker Act.
Part I of this Article summarizes the relevant provisions of the Tucker
Act, and examines courts' interpretations of whether a district court had
jurisdiction over a claim when a potential judgment exceeded $10,000. This
Article suggests that, over time, traditional Tucker Act jurisdiction has been
distorted by the appearance of a new kind of plaintiff'3 seeking "structural
reform"' 4 rather than the kinds of compensation envisioned by the Act.
This Article also suggests that Tucker Act jurisdiction has been distorted by
two congressional actions: the creation of the judgment fund;' 5 and amend-
ments to the Administrative Procedure Act.' 6 These congressional actions
could be construed to extend district court jurisdiction over claims for
money damages. As a result, the distinction between Tucker and non-
Tucker Act remedies has been blurred.
Government argued that because the claim was for money damages in excess of the $10,000
Little Tucker Act jurisdictional limit, the district court should have dismissed the case or
transferred it to the Claims Court. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that Mitchell's request for
active duty credit and reinstatement to active duty was neither a request for monetary relief
nor money damages; thus, the district court had sole jurisdiction. Id. at 897. The Federal
Circuit, noting the Claims Court's extensive experience with back pay suits, held that the
Claims Court had explicit statutory authority to hear Mitchell's claim. The court relied on the
Bowen majority's distinction between grant-in-aid cases and back pay cases, thereby limiting
Bowen's applicability, a decision this Article supports. Id.
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4652
(1988); H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 6014-15.
12. Compare, e.g., Fallon, Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 517, 531-
32 (1991) (rejecting Justice Scalia's assertion that the Claims Court's jurisdiction has been
obliterated) with Sisk, Two Proposals to Clarify the Tucker Act Jurisdiction of the Claims Court.
37 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 47, 49 (1990) (quoting Justice Scalia's criticism of Bowen that "[t]he
Court cannot possibly mean what it says today").
13. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
14. "The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a
threat to those values posed by present institutional arrangements. The injunction is the
means by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted." Fallon, Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudences of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1, 4 (1984).
15. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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Part 11 of this Article explicates the case law before and after the passage
of the APA and its relevant amendments. This Article notes how, in the
1980's, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began to assert that state suits
against the Federal Government seeking reimbursement of grant-in-aid
funds 7 should be treated as Tucker Act claims and tried in the United
States Claims Court, rather than as non-Tucker Act claims to be tried in the
district courts. Although the DOJ achieved some measure of success, Judge
Bork, in a masterful display of judicial legerdemain, offered alternative rea-
soning which became the basis for the Bowen decision. This alternative was
superficially attractive but intrinsically false and created the impression that
Bowen had diminished the traditional jurisdiction of the Claims Court and
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Part III discusses and analyzes the Bowen case, outlining its procedural
history, and highlighting the United States Supreme Court's efforts to distin-
guish Bowen from the "run of the mill" Tucker Act suits. In part IV, this
Article offers alternative interpretations of the Bowen ruling. Finally, part V
of this Article advances the "preferred solution" and suggests how the
Bowen decision can be reconciled with a century of case law, thereby avoid-
ing the kind of judicial nihilism evidenced in this Article's introductory
quotation.
I. THE TUCKER ACT
A. Antecedents and Structure
The United States Constitution provides that "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."' 8
Accordingly, Congress, from its inception, required individuals seeking pri-
vate relief to confront Congress with petitions for compensation. 9 For ad-
ministrative purposes, Congress made an early attempt to delegate this
claims adjudication function to the judiciary. Its attempt, however, foun-
17. "The federal government has long had various measures for transferring fiscal re-
sources from rich to poor states. Traditionally, federal assistance to state and local govern-
ments has taken four forms: (1) categorical grants-in-aid directly related to narrow purposes
as defined by Congress and administered with tight grantor control; (2) block grants struc-
tured to consolidate narrow categorical grants but with broader grantee discretion and less
grantor control; (3) intergovernmental loans; and (4) general revenue sharing of federal funds
with few restrictions." Shurtz, State Taxation of Energy Resources: Are Consuming States
Getting Burned?, 36 VAND. L. REv. 55, 96-97 (1983).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
19. See generally, Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 POL. Sci. Q. 625 (1893)
(discussing jurisdiction of courts over the state and the state's liability for claims against it).
[Vol. 40:571
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dered on the separation of powers doctrine.20 After the appointment of sev-
eral ad hoc commissions, 21 Congress attempted to alleviate the workload
and injustices of private relief bill legislation by passing the Court of Claims
Act of 1855.22 The Act established a tribunal which investigated claims
based upon any congressional law, executive department regulation, or ex-
press or implied contract with the Federal Government.23 After investigat-
ing a claim, the tribunal was to make recommendations to Congress. In
1864, the United States Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from the
United States Court of Claims on the grounds that the court's judgments
were subject to non-judicial review when Congress appropriated funds to
pay the judgments.24 Congress quickly eliminated the offensive provision
that allowed executive review,25 and the Supreme Court acknowledged its
jurisdiction over Court of Claims judgments. 26
In 1887, when Congress passed the Tucker Act,2 7 it added two new fea-
tures to the claims mechanism: first, it permitted claims founded upon the
United States Constitution; 28 second, it granted circuit courts concurrent ju-
risdiction with the Court of Claims over claims for money damages up to
$10,000.29 Thus, by 1887, the Tucker Act had assumed its present contours,
permitting suits against the United States in three circumstances, contrac-
20. Hayburns Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-14 (1792). In 1792, Congress attempted to
assign some of its claims processing activities to the courts without making the courts' deci-
sions on the claims final. The United States Supreme Court refused to take on the non-judicial
duties of claims processing in Hayburns Case. Id.
21. For example, Congress created two ad hoc commissions to address claims arising
from the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. See W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS, JR. & M. BEN-
NEIr, The United States Court of Claims: A History, reprinted in 216 Ct. Cl. 1, 7-13 (1978)
(citing Act of April 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 11, 3 Stat. 263; Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 107, 9 Stat.
393).
22. Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. See W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS, M. BENNETT, supra note 21 at
12-16; see also Crane, Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Claims, 34 HARv. L. REV. 161,
166 (1920) (noting that Congress often delayed acting upon private bills).
23. Court of Claims Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
24. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (holding that the Supreme
Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims under the Constitution)
(superseded by Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9).
25. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 768, repealed by Act of March 17, 1866,
ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
26. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886) (reciting history of the United States
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over Tucker Act judgments).
27. Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
28. The statute permitted a judicial remedy pursuant to the fifth amendment's takings
clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
29. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. The Tucker Act gave regional circuit courts juris-
diction for claims up to $10,000. In 1911, after abolishing these circuit courts, Congress gave
district courts the same concurrent jurisdiction. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
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tual claims, noncontractual claims where plaintiff seeks the return of money
paid to the government, and, noncontractual claims where the plaintiff as-
serts that he is entitled to payment by the government."0
B. Characteristics of Tucker Act Jurisdiction
1. The Vindication of Personal Rights
Although there is little legislative history of the Court of Claims and
Tucker Act statutes, Congress clearly intended for the court to vindicate the
rights of claimants by "render[ing] prompt justice against itself, in favor of
[its] citizens.""1 Professor Hohfeld, in Some Fundamental Legal Concep-
The $10,000 jurisdictional limit represented a congressional compromise which balanced
two goals: one, to protect the United States Treasury by requiring that claimants lodge claims
against the United States in Washington, D.C. where departmental heads reside; and two, to
reduce claimants' inconvenience and travel expense to Washington, D.C. to litigate relatively
small claims. Note, Sovereign Immunity: District Court Jurisdiction for Damage Awards Ex-
ceeding $10,000 Against Federal Officers for Unconstitutional or Ultra Vires Acts; 3 HAMLINE
L. REV. 163, 171 (1980). By failing to raise the $10,000 jurisdictional limit for over a century,
Congress frustrated the purposes of the dual jurisdictional grant. If the $10,000 limitation had
been indexed for inflation, the limitation at the district court would be $131,000 today. If this
higher limit applied, those claimants who desired to sue the government in district court would
not be forced to attempt to convert bare money claims into suits seeking specific relief. See
generally United States Bureau of Census HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES To 1970 (1975) (for the computation of 1887 dollars to 1967 dollars);
United States Bureau of Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1990
(1990) (for computation of 1967 dollars to 1988 dollars).
30. The Court of Claims divided non-contractual claims into two classes:
[1] those in which the plaintiff has paid money over to the government, directly or in
effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum; and [2] those instances in which
money has not been paid but plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a
payment from the treasury.
Eastport S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In the first class of
suits, the claimant must assert that money or property has been taken in contravention of the
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation. Tax refund cases and cases involving sums exacted by
a federal agency are examples of the first class. See. e.g., Clapp v. United States, 117 F. Supp.
576 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (sums exacted from purchasers of vessels by Maritime Commission re-
turned) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954).
The second class of suits contains cases where the government has failed to pay money and
the claimant asserts that a particular provision of law grants him the right to be paid a sum
certain. Examples include inverse condemnation cases, retirement and back pay cases, and
claims for compensation. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725
(1950) (claim for deprivation of riparian rights based on the Rivers and Harbors Act); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (inverse condemnation suit based on the government's
violation of statutes regulating aircraft flight plans); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248
(Ct. Cl. 1948) (claiming retired pay and allowances under a personnel act for naval aviation
employees); Elchibegoff v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 541 (1946) (government employee dis-
charge case based on a civil service commission rule).
31. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 213 (1983) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 App. (1861) (President Lincoln's State of the Union Message)). "Person"
[Vol. 40:571
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tions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 32 distinguishes between two types of
plaintiffs, classifying their status as either natural or unnatural. Natural
plaintiffs are those who seek redress of injuries for harms compensable at
common law and claim the breach of a right which runs to them.33 Unnatu-
ral plaintiffs are those who "aspire to secure the enforcement of legal princi-
ples that touch others as directly as themselves and that are valued for moral
or political reasons independent of economic interests."3 While it is true
that suits against the United States are not suits at common law, Congress
originally intended that the Court of Claims grant damages for the vindica-
tion of individual rights.3 5 The means by which the Hohfeldian plaintiff
gains the right to sue at the Claims Court is determined by the classic judi-
cial test of whether a statutory right gives rise to a Tucker Act claim. In
Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 36 the court noted that "some spe-
cific provision of law [must] embod[y] a command to the United States to
pay the plaintiff some money, upon proof of conditions which he is said to
meet."
37
2. The Award of Money Damages
The Bowen decision turned on the majority's conclusion that a suit for
Medicaid funds was not a suit for damages.38 As one critic explained, the
Bowen Court erroneously defined the term damages "in ways that are unsup-
was construed early in the history of the court to include corporations, as well as states. Loui-
siana v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 85, 90, aff'd 123 U.S. 32 (1887) (a state, like a public
corporation makes contracts, does business like an individual, and has the same rights and
remedies in court); Livingston, Bell & Co. v. United States, 3 Ct. C1. 131 (1867).
32. 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-44 (1923); see also Fallon, supra note 14, at 3-8 (1984) (noting
that the terms "Hohfeldian" and "non-Hohfeldian" plaintiff are terms of art in the scholarly
writings on standing); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian Or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1968) (characterizing a Hohfeldian plain-
tiff as one "seeking a determination that he has a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power").
33. Hohfeldian plaintiffs could bring suit only if they were vindicating a right for which
there was a correlative duty owed to them by defendant. Hohfeld, supra note 32, at 31.
34. Fallon, supra note 14, at 4. This Article will refer to the unnatural plaintiff as a "non-
Hohfeldian plaintiff."
35. McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880). "As article III jurisprudence
developed, it relied increasingly on the private rights, or 'Hohfeldian,' model as its paradigm of
litigation. This model, by definition, asks. . .court[s] to resolve ... dispute[s] between two
parties." Comment, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (1988) (footnote omitted).
36. 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
398, 401-02 (1976) (approving Eastport).
37. Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1008; see also Cohen, Claims for Money in the Claims Court, 40
CATH. U.L. REV. 533, 540-47 (1991) (discussing statutes requiring a monetary payment).
38. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 908 (1988).
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ported by any historical notion of the common law damages remedy. ' 39 To
understand the flawed reasoning of the Bowen decision, a review of the nine-
teenth century meaning of the term "damages" is necessary.
In trespass cases, very early common law courts provided for either a fixed
bdt appointed by law, or the award of fact specific compensation.' The
second category, fact specific compensation, subsequently came to be de-
scribed as damages, and the term was extended to losses which arose from
the breach of a promise.4 ' The late nineteenth century case, Scott v. Don-
ald,42 defined damages as "compensation which the law will award for an
injury done."43 In this respect, damages awarded were substitutionary re-
lief. Damages gave the plaintiff money, by way of compensation, to make up
for some loss that was not originally a money loss, but one that ordinarily
could be measured in money. It was only with the development of the writ
of assumpsit, however, that courts proceeded to award compensation, or
damages, for failure to perform a promise."
The branch of the law which came to be known as "quasi-contract" devel-
oped slowly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.4 5 This development
39. Webster, Choice of Forum in Claims Litigation, 37 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 534, 535
(1990) [hereinafter Webster, Choice of Forum] (stating that "the Court misdefined 'damages'
which are... the key to interpreting the statutory phrase (of section 702] permitting residual
district court relief"); see also Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity: 5 U.S.C § 702
Spells Relief, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 725, 735-37 (1988) [hereinafter Webster, Beyond Federal Sover-
eign Immunity]. Webster notes that damages should be defined "not by what might be, but
rather by their compensatory purpose and enforcement by writ." Id. at 736 (emphasis supplied)
(footnote omitted). Webster finds the Bowen Court's definition of damages incorrectly based
on the underlying claim:
The Court opened a can of worms with its apparent suggestion that Massachusetts'
relief was not damages because the underlying claim was for enforcement of a statute
.... The usual relief granted in Tucker Act claims is damages. Statutory claims do
not a nondamages action make.... [Further,] [d]amages do not become something
else simply because the Court might order alternative relief.
Id. at 735-36 (emphasis in original).
40. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 370 (5th ed. 1948)
(tracing change of Anglo-Saxon bdt to damages); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIs-
TORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 523 (2d ed. 1968) (damages assessed as proper compensation for
the particular wrong suffered by the plaintiff).
41. A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 67 (1987) (noting the
same concept of a fixed sum due applied in debt cases).
42. 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
43. Id. at 86.
44. A. SIMPSON, supra note 41, at 68; see also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 451 (7th ed. 1956) (citing Slades' Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1826), which established
the character of the action of assumpsit and allowed a remedy for breach of purely executory
contracts).
45. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 447-54.
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culminated in the case of Moses v. McFerlan,4 6 which permitted a suit in
assumpsit on an implied promise.47 In some quasi-contract cases, the
amount claimed was similar to an action in debt for a sum certain: for
money had and received, or money paid on account. 48 In other cases, the
claim was similar to an action in assumpsit where the plaintiff sought reason-
able compensation for either goods received or services rendered.49 Whether
the quasi-contract case sounded in debt (for a sum certain) or assumpsit (for
fact specific compensation), courts described the amount sought to be recov-
ered as damages.5 ° Thus, by the time Congress passed the Tucker Act in
1887, any claim for, or award of, a money judgment arising from an action
at law would be described, albeit improperly, as "damages" - without re-
gard to the theory of liability on which the plaintiff relied. 5 The term
"damages" was also used to describe monetary awards granted as part of
equitable relief.52
Tucker Act suits involved suits for money damages, whether they were for
a sum certain (as in entitlement cases) or were for fact specific compensation
(as in breach of contract or takings cases). They could be distinguished from
suits for money damages brought in district courts as equitable claims or as
legal actions because Tucker Act suits were always against the United States
whereas non-Tucker Act suits were suits against the government officer. In
this latter type of suit, courts assumed that the officer against whom the suit
was brought was holding money appropriated by Congress for the very pur-
pose sought by the plaintiff." Until 1956, judgments against the United
46. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
47. Id. at 678.
48. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, 235-38 (1973).
49. Id.
50. See Dutch v. Warren, 93 Eng. Rep. 598 (K.B. 1720) (for an example of a court's
misapplication of the term "damages" in an equitable action) (cited in Moses v. McFerlan, 97
Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (K.B. 1760)).
51. See, e.g., Doherty v. Aaron Machinery Co., 238 N.Y.S.2d 179, 18 A.D.2d 915 (1963);
Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 320
(1951).
52. See, e.g., Dutch, 93 Eng. Rep. at 598.
53. In the absence of an appropriation, mandamus will not lie. See, e.g., McAdoo v.
Ormes, 47 App. D.C. 364 (1918) (noting that "where money has been appropriated by Con-
gress... the Officials of the Treasury Department are charged with the ministerial duty of
making payment upon the demand of the person in whose favor the appropriation has been
made, and they may be compelled to make payment to mandamus") (emphasis supplied), aff'd
sub nom. Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920).
Compare Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 419, 422 (1933) (no cause of action because no
appropriation by Congress) and Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 863
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (where no new issue raised from prior suit, reaffirmation of previous judgment
is barred), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 825 (1957) with Mack, Compulsory Process to the Comptroller
General, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 97, 101 (1934) (discussing Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442,
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States were, with few exceptions, paid from funds specially appropriated by
Congress.54 Thus, awards by district courts, pursuant to ancillary equitable
jurisdiction or a mandamus action, were made by a government official from
previously appropriated funds while Congress had to appropriate new funds
to pay Tucker Act judgments. Therefore, a claimant seeking money from
the government might attempt to bring his claim in district court as an alter-
native to a Tucker Act suit.
II. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES TO THE TUCKER ACT
A. Remedies Available Before the Passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act
Prior to the passage of the APA, there was a potential alternative judicial
remedy available to persons seeking relief which could include a monetary
component. This remedy was asserted through the writ of mandamus."
The United States Supreme Court applied this remedy in Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 6 and affirmed the issuance of a writ which directed the
Post Master General to pay a claim allowed by the solicitor of the
Treasury.
57
The writ, however, would not issue if it would interfere with the judgment
or discretion of the executive branch." Further, by the time Congress
passed the Court of Claims and Tucker Acts, it was clear that mandamus
454 (1934), and noting that "the duty of the disbursing officer to pay the voucher in question
'is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt... and so ministerial that its performance
may be compelled by mandamus' ") (quoting Wilbur v. United States, 281 U.S. 206, 218
(1930)).
54. See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 147, 13 Stat. 145, 148 (where Congress appropri-
ated a lump sum for payments of judgments to be rendered by the Court of Claims). Congres-
sional control over the award of money judgments continued until the relatively recent
creation of a permanent indefinite appropriation. Act of July 27, 1956, 70 Stat. 694, (codified
at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988)).
55. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Chief
Justice Marshall affirmed the availability of the writ of mandamus against a government
official:
where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individ-
uals, in the performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of
the President, and the performance of which the President cannot lawfully forbid ...
in such cases, it is not perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further
excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to an injured individ-
ual, than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a
department.
Id. at 171.
56. 37 U.S. 524 (1838).
57. Id at 532.
58. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 517 (1840).
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would not issue in the context of a dispute over rights. 9 The fact that a
plaintiff had a potential remedy at law in the Court of Claims, however,
would not preclude a mandamus action." It is noteworthy that although
the financial consequences of the mandamus writ fell on the Federal Govern-
ment and could exceed $10,000, Little Tucker Act jurisdiction limitation
was never invoked, nor were the financial consequences described as
"damages."
. Remedies After the Passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
Significantly, when Congress passed the APA in 194661 and provided a
statutory basis to judicial review of agency action, it did not speak to the
issue of monetary compensation for past interference with rights. 62 Section
702 of the APA established a right of judicial review: "A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial
review thereof."63 Further, section 704 of the Act made "[a]gency action...
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court ... subject to judicial review." 64
In 1976, Congress added three sentences to section 702:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than
money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United
States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judg-
ment or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided,
That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal
officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in of-
59. United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (I How.) 284 (1855); see also Note,
Mandatory Injunctions as Substitutes for Writs of Mandamus in the Federal District Courts: A
Study in Procedural Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1938).
60. Compare Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) and Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388
(1918) (claims for specific compensation brought as mandamus actions) with Benedict v.
United States, 176 U.S. 357 (1900) (claim for specified compensation brought as a Tucker Act
suit). Thus, the plaintiff's election might well turn on the availability of appropriated funds to
satisfy the claim. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
61. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
62. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 250, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1195.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
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fice, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) af-
fects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of
the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appro-
priate legal ground or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to
grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly
or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.65
The Committee report explained the statutory reference to "any other stat-
ute that grants consent to suit or expressly or impliedly forbids the relief"'66
with the example of the Court of Claims Act's formulation of a damage
remedy for contract claims confining jurisdiction to the Court of Claims for
suits in excess of $10,000.67 Congress intended this measure to bar specific
performance of government contracts. Under this provision, the Tucker Act
" 'impliedly forbids' relief other than the remedy provided by the Act.",61
Thus, the amendment to section 702, partially abolishing sovereign immu-
nity, did not modify existing boundaries on specific relief contained in stat-
utes handling such matters. Clearly, the Committee intended to rule out
other remedies for statutes which allowed suit and dictated particular reme-
dies. 69 The amended provision also stressed that the necessary intent can be
implied, as well as expressed. 0
A standard text, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 71
summarized the purpose of the amendment to section 702 as follows:
A reading of the hearings and committee reports seems to reveal a
legislative intention merely to clear the air of unthinking invoca-
tions of sovereign immunity as grounds for dismissing suits for spe-
cific relief and to substitute deliberate balancing of the need for
judicial review to protect against illegal official action and undue
interference with government actions.72
Commentators viewed the passage of the 1976 amendment of the APA as a
reaffirmance of the status quo. 7" Nevertheless, the burgeoning number of
district court suits questioning the Executive Branch's efforts to limit eligi-
bility to federal entitlements apparently compelled the DOJ to try a new
65. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6121, 6133.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.
71. J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ, S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT (2d ed. 1983).
72. Id. at 332.
73. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 39, at 731; Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of Sovereign
Immunity, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 271 (1977).
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tactic.74 Because these suits were typically brought as class actions involving
claims in excess of $10,000, the DOJ argued that the claims were in fact
Tucker Act claims over which the Court of Claims had sole jurisdiction. "
While it was true that the DOJ's efforts to use this tactic after the 1976
amendment foundered, some of these cases involved claims which, if satis-
fied, would have been paid from the permanent indefinite appropriation, and
were thus apparent efforts to circumvent the Tucker Act.76 Claims to ac-
counts specifically appropriated by Congress, such as grant-in-aid programs,
however, raised a more difficult question.
I. BOwEN V MASSACHUSETTS
The Medicaid Program, 77 established in 1965 by Congress, is one of sev-
eral grant-in-aid71 programs which Congress intended to provide federal fi-
nancial assistance to states to meet specified objectives. 9 "Although the
federal contribution to a State's Medicaid program is referred to as a 'reim-
bursement,' the stream of revenue is actually a series of huge quarterly ad-
vance payments that are based on the State's estimate of its anticipated
future expenditures."8° Between 1978 and 1982, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), which administers the grant program, contrib-
uted nearly $5 billion to the Massachusetts Medicaid program. More than
ten percent of the Massachusetts contribution, or $546 million, provided
medical and rehabilitative services to mentally retarded patients in interme-
diate care facilities."' In 1982, HHS disallowed $6.4 million of claimed re-
imbursements for treatment of the mentally retarded between July 1, 1978,
and December 31, 1980, on the ground that the claim was actually for edu-
cational expenses, not medical expenses.8 2
74. See, e.g., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (Federal Government
argued exclusive Court of Claims jurisdiction and court disagreed), cerm denied, 454 U.S. 855
(1981); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (although the Federal Government
will incur an expense in complying with injunctive relief, the creation of such expense does not
necessarily remove that form of relief), cert denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
75. See Belier, 632 F.2d at 795.
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying discussion.
77. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343.
78. Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, PAD 81-27, p. 61-62 (distin-
guishing "grants" which are made to non-governmental entities).
79. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1901, 79 Stat. 343 (indicat-
ing that the purpose of the Act was to enable "each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance... and (2) rehabilitation and other
services").
80. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 883-84 (1988) (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 886 n.6.
82. Id. at 886-87.
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A. The Evolution of Bowen
Following established procedures under 42 U.S.C. § 1396,83 the State ap-
pealed the disallowance to HHS's Grant Appeals Board, which affirmed the
administrative decision. Invoking federal question jurisdiction, the State
then filed suit against the Secretary of the Department in the District Court
for Massachusetts.8 4 The State alleged that the United States had waived its
sovereign immunity under section 702 of the APA. 5 The state sought de-
claratox'y and injunctive relief, asking the court to set aside the Board's or-
der.86 A second suit followed when the Department disallowed, for the
same reasons, nearly $5 million of claimed reimbursements for the period
January 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982.87
District court suits appealing a federal disallowance of a grant-in-aid reim-
bursement claim were not uncommon. A number of cases, both before and
after the 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, had
reached the regional courts of appeals. 8 In Bowen, the district court treated
Massachusetts's suit as a routine claim under the APA.89 After reviewing
the claim, the court concluded that the statute's language entitled the plain-
tiff to reimbursement for the expenses incurred between July 1978 and De-
cember 1980 and it granted the State's motion for summary judgment.'
Three months later, the same judge granted on the same ground the State's
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
84. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 887.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
86. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 887.
87. Id. at 887-88.
88. See Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985) (dis-
trict court reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services' denial of Connecticut's
reimbursement request under the Medicaid Act); Illinois v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 571 (7th Cir.
1986) (district court reviewed Department of Health and Human Services' disallowance of
Illinois' reimbursement request under the Social Security Act); Illinois v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 288
(7th Cir. 1986) (same); Mississippi Medicaid Comm'n v. Heckler, 633 F. Supp. 78 (S.D. Miss.
1985) (district court reviewed Department of Health and Human Services' disallowance of
claims under the Medicaid Act), aff'd, 786 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1986); Oregon v. Heckler, 651
F. Supp. 6 (D. Or. 1984) (district court reviewed agency's denial of Oregon's claim for federal
reimbursement of administrative costs under the Aid To Families with Dependent Children
Foster Care program); Illinois v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 594 F.
Supp. 147 (N.D. Il1. 1984) (district court reviewed agency's disallowance of Illinois's reim-
bursement request under Medicaid).
89. "Decisions of the [Department Grant Appeals] are... reviewable in a United States
District Court." Massachusetts v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 687, 689 n.2 (D.C. Mass. 1985), aff'd
In part, vacated in part sub nom., Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. 816
F.2d 796 (1st Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor., Bowen v. Massachusetts 487 U.S.
879 (1988).
90. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. at 693-95.
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motion for summary judgement on its appeal from the disallowed expendi-
tures for the period January 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982.
The Secretary of HHS appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit on two grounds: first, that the district court erred in its analysis of the
Agency's decision; and, second, that the court lacked jurisdiction to order
release of the withheld funds because the claim to those funds fell solely
within the Claims Court's Tucker Act jurisdiction.9 The Secretary argued,
therefore, that the suit was barred by section 702 of the APA which limited
jurisdiction of the district courts to suits "seeking relief other than money
damages."'9 2
The Federal Government had used this jurisdictional argument in other
cases seeking specific relief, with varying degrees of success.93 In particular,
the DOJ advanced this argument in another Medicaid decision pending
before the First Circuit.94 The decision in Massachusetts v. Departmental
Grant Appeals Board 9 guided the circuit court's decision in Bowen. 96 Grant
Appeals Board involved a Medicaid disallowance which was wholly retro-
spective, and the court concluded that, as such, the relief sought was solely
for money damages and should have been brought in the United States
Claims Court as a Tucker Act suit. 97 Bowen, however, presented a more
difficult problem because the relief sought was both retrospective and pro-
91. Id
92. Secretary of Health & Human Sers., 816 F.2d at 799.
93. Id. The earliest case where a court accepted this jurisdictional argument was Carter
v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970) (argument accepted
in suit for declaratory judgment that officer's discharge was illegal, and seeking back pay and
reinstatement). See also Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1985) (reversing district
court and accepting the argument in suit by Public Health Service Officers seeking declaration
that constructive service credit should be granted them and the award of back pay in excess of
$10,000); Chu v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming in part, reversing in
part, accepted argument by Public Health Service that adjudication must take place in the
Court of Claims); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejected in
suit by corporation seeking declaratory judgment that it possessed contract rights against the
United States); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (accepted in mandamus
suit seeking unliquidated damages); Doko Farms v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 867 (N.D.
Tex. 1984) (rejected mandamus suit by farmers seeking release of funds withheld because of
alleged overpayments); Wingate v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 58, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (accepted
argument and noted that declaratory relief is merely incidental to principal remedy of dam-
ages); United States v. Pennsylvania, 394 F. Supp. 261 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (rejected in State's
counterclaim seeking mandamus to release withheld Medicare funds); Brown v. United States,
365 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (rejected in mandamus suit seeking return of fines or forfeit-
ures levied by an invalid court-martial), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 508 F.2d
618 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975).
94. Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Bd., 815 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1987).
95. Id
96. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 889 (1988).
97. 815 F.2d at 782.
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spective. The retrospective relief sought was the release of the $10 million
withheld. The prospective relief sought was confirmation of the Common-
wealth's right to future reimbursement for the services which the Grant
Board had ruled were ineligible. The Bowen court concluded that section
702 and the Tucker Act barred any retrospective claim for money and re-
manded the case after concluding that the district court had properly va-
cated the Grant Appeals Board's decision.9" The court of appeals, in that
ruling, disassociated itself from the test applied in New Mexico v. Regan,99 a
1984 Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decision which had looked to
the intent of the complainant in deciding whether the primary objective of
the suitor was money damages or non-monetary relief."co The Bowen court
concluded that the district court could, at most, order a more comprehensive
audit of the questioned services."° ' If, after such an audit, the court con-
cluded that reimbursement should be made, the State would have to bring
suit in the Claims Court for money past due.' 0 2
Rather than accepting the remand, the Secretary, and subsequently the
State, sought and were granted certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. °3 The original appeal had been taken from a district court's order
granting the State's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, there were
two noticeable gaps in the record: it was unclear, first, whether the State had
retained the amount in dispute and, second, whether the Secretary had with-
held the disputed amounts from the next quarterly payment due the State."'
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,"°5 framed the issue as whether
the district court had jurisdiction to review Secretary Bowen's final order
98. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 910. Although the court did not say so, presumably it would have
permitted a claim which fell within a district court's "Little Tucker Act" jurisdiction.
99. 745 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
100. Id at 1322.
101. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 910.
102. See id.
103. Id at 879.
104. Id. at 887 n.8 & n.9.
105. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined the majority. Id. at 881.
Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Id at 912. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy dissented. Id. at 913.
The importance of the case is evidenced by the number of organizations submitting amici
briefs in support of the State. Their labors, however, and those of Massachusetts, did little to
enlighten the majority. Briefs were filed by the State of California, the Center on law and
Social Policy, Michigan Legal Services, National Health Law Program, National Housing Law
Project, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Senior Citizens Law Center,
Solano County (California) Legal Assistance, Council of State Governments, International
City Management Association, National Association of Counties, National Conference of
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refusing to reimburse the State for certain expenditures made pursuant to
the program."°6 The majority rejected certain obvious criteria which courts
had used to reconcile the conflict between the APA and the Tucker Act.' 0 7
Courts have held, for example, that whenever a claimant seeks a judgment
against the United States which exceeds $10,000, the Claims Court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction."' The Federal Government took this position in
Bowen. Nevertheless, the Bowen majority concluded that despite Claims
Court jurisdiction over "the purely monetary aspects of the case,"' 9 the
district court was free to exercise its equitable jurisdiction under the APA.
The majority also concluded that as part of that equitable jurisdiction, the
district court could issue a decree directing the Secretary to release the
money to the state." 0 The majority opinion concluded that the district
court had both the jurisdiction and the power to grant the State complete
relief.
In holding that the district court and not the Claims Court was the proper
forum, Justice Stevens reasoned that a court's disallowance decision was not
an award for "damages;' " rather, it was an adjustment in the federal grant
funds paid to the state. Further, the Court indicated that a suit in the
Claims Court would not have provided an "adequate remedy at law."' 12
In his dissenting opinion," 3 Justice Scalia disagreed with both proposi-
tions. He emphasized that the distinction between damages and specific re-
lief must be based on the substance, and not the form, of the claim."'
Further, he viewed the request for retroactive reclassification, or reimburse-
ment for funds already expended under the program, as a claim barred in the
State Legislatures, United States Conference of Mayors, National Governors Association, Na-
tional League of Cities, and the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
106. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 882. The Secretary argued that the United States Claims Court
had exclusive jurisdiction over the State's claim. Id. at 890.
107. See, e.g., Bowman, Bowen v. Massachusetts: The "Money Damages Exception" to the
Administrative Procedure Act and Grant-in-Aid Litigation, 21 URB. LAW. 557, 571 n.59 (1989)
(noting the Court's failure to rely on precedent and stating that "[in fact, the Court virtually
ignored the case law developed under § 702, apart from Judge Bork's decision in the Maryland
case"). For a full discussion of Judge Bork's analysis, see infra notes 143-54 and accompany-
ing text.
108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
109. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 910-11, n.48.
110. Id
111. Id. at 893. Justice Stevens reaches the same conclusion regardless of whether the
court's decision affirms or reverses the disallowance decision. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 913 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 915.
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district court because of the adequate available remedy in the Claims
Court. " 5
C. Ambiguities in Bowen
Even supporters of the outcome have described the Bowen majority opin-
ion as "fail[ing] to answer correctly the complex issues before the Court;""16
as "less brilliant [than the dissent];"' '17 and, as employing artificial canons of
statutory construction and creating a mythical legislative history.I18 More-
over, there is a consensus among scholars that the majority failed to set crite-
ria for litigants and subordinate courts that would enable them to decide
whether a non-tort suit resulting in the disbursement of federal funds is a
suit for money damages that must be brought under the Tucker Act." 9
As noted above, the Bowen majority observed that:
If, however, § 702 of the APA is construed to authorize a district
court to grant monetary relief--other than traditional "money
damages"-as an incident to the complete relief that is appropriate
in the review of agency action, the fact that the purely monetary
aspects of the case could have been decided in the Claims Court is
not a sufficient reason to bar that aspect of the relief available in a
district court. "0
The passage is ambiguous because it is introduced by the conditional "if."
There is general agreement that Congress implemented the amendments to 5
U.S.C. § 7022' and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)"' to facilitate district courts' exer-
cise of jurisdiction in suits seeking to control the actions of government offi-
cials."23 Congress clearly intended the section 702 amendment, 124 designed
115. Id. at 922. Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the district court would be the
proper forum for the State's action seeking injunctive relief with a prospective effect. Id. at
921.
116. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 725.
117. Mason, Bowen and the Nichomachean Ethic, 24 PuB. CoNr. NEWSL., No. 2, 14
(1989) (suggesting that the Court reached a sound result despite Mason's criticism of the ma-
jority's opinion).
118. Bowman, supra note 107, at 572-73. Bowman notes that "by employing a variety of
canons of statutory construction .... the Bowen majority purported to answer the following
question: what did the 94th Congress have in mind when it inserted the phrase 'money dam-
ages' into section 702 of the APA?" She admits that Bowen was not necessarily wrongly de-
cided, despite the Court's incorrect focus on congressional intent. She suggests, however, that
the Court should have addressed the question: "[h]ow would the enacting legislators have
wanted this statute applied to a situation they did not foresee?" Id. at 575.
119. See, e.g., supra notes 116-18.
120. Id. at 910-11, n.48.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1988).
123. See J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 71, at 330-31.
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to remove restrictions on actions for injunctions, declaratory relief, and
mandamus, to enhance district courts' equitable jurisdiction. 2 ' Thus, the
conditional "if" must be addressed to determine whether a district court,
exercising its equitable jurisdiction in a public law case, can award ancillary
monetary relief, commonly described as damages.' 2 6 All federal courts had
assumed that they could award such relief. They disagreed, however, over
the application of the Little Tucker Act's $10,000 jurisdictional
limitation. 127
The Bowen Court's ultimate ruling on behalf of the State seems to assume
that the jurisdictional limit does not apply. This is the interpretation that
Justice Scalia applied in his dissent.' 28 The majority's use, however, of the
conditional "if" could lead to the alternative interpretation that the state-
ment is dicta, and that the actual thrust of the Bowen decision is based on a
holding that the State had no substantive claim for Tucker Act damages.' 29
In view of the dissent's interpretation, it is doubtful that the government
could successfully advance a "Little Tucker Act" argument in post-Bowen
cases.
A further factor that courts should consider is distinguishing a prospective
judgment from a retrospective judgment. A prospective judgment would
prospectively affect the agency's interpretation of its regulations, and collat-
erally give rise to a suit for payments for past misinterpretations. A retro-
spective Tucker Act claim, on the other hand, seeks retrospective money
awards and may collaterally affect the agency's prospective interpretation of
its regulations.' 3 ° This position was taken by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Minnesota ex rel. Noot v. Heckler, 3 ' and subsequently fol-
124. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
125. Although mandamus was traditionally a legal writ, its issuance is to be governed by
equitable principles. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Cf Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
425 (1987) (suggesting that the "Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition
to, or independent of, legal relief").
127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text,
128. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48 (1988); see also id. at 925 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 457 (7th ed. 1956) to
establish that the term "adequate remedy" was derived from equity but failing to note Holds-
worth's discussion of ancillary monetary relief).
129. See Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 735 n.73.
130. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 889 (making the prospective/retrospective distinction).
131. 718 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983). In Noot, Minnesota claimed and was paid $896,159 in
federal financial participation funds for services provided to Medicare recipients at three Inter-
mediate Care Facilities. Id. at 855. These funds were disbursed by the HHS Health Care
Financing Administration for one quarter. In an audit report, HHS characterized the facilities
in question as "institutions for mental diseases" and disallowed the claim by offsetting the paid
amount against federal financial participation in a supplemental grant to the state. After ex-
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lowed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Kozera v. Spirito. 1 32
Unfortunately, this position was rejected by the Bowen Court.133
Most importantly, the majority ignored the fact that the goal of the claim-
ant should be dispositive. If the claimant's real effort is to obtain a money
judgment, even though declaratory and injunctive relief are sought, then the
suit should be transferred to the Claims Court. The Third,
34 Fifth, 35
Ninth, 36 and Tenth Circuits,'3 7 had taken this "ultimate purpose" ap-
proach. The Bowen majority did not rely on these cases;' 3 s instead, it relied
on an alternative test,' 39 effectively rejecting the "ultimate purpose" test. 140
hausting administrative remedies, Minnesota filed for review in the district court. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Minnesota, holding that HHS acted arbitrarily
and capriciously. Id. at 856. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that, although the district court had jurisdiction to review the disallowance and to
grant prospectively declaratory relief, the award of money damages was exclusively in the
jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Id. at 857. The court further reasoned that although the
Claims Court had the power to grant limited equitable relief collateral to damages, in this
instance the injunctive relief would have significant prospective effect. The appeals court,
therefore, bifurcated the claims because of the limited jurisdiction of both courts. Id. at 858.
132. 723 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1983). In Kozera, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare filed a third party complaint against the Secretary of Health and Human Services
responding to a challenge to a state regulation that had recently been promulgated to conform
with its Federal counterpart. Id. at 1004-05. The third party complaint alleged that if the
state regulation violated the federal Constitution or a federal statute, so did the federal regula-
tion. The Secretary removed the case to federal court, and the case was dismissed on sovereign
immunity grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit closely
examined the distinction between prospective and retroactive relief, holding that in the case at
bar, because the relief sought was equitable, jurisdiction was properly in district court, even
though the injunction might result in increased outlays of federal funds. Id. at 1009.
133. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 904-05.
134. Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (a claim for injunctive relief to
provide medical care is in fact a claim for monetary damages), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979).
135. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 367 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff cannot avoid
Claims Court Tucker Act jurisdiction by characterizing action as equitable), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988).
136. Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bell, 762 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1985) (where real effort is
to obtain money, exclusive jurisdiction is in Court of Claims, even when the complaint is
framed to seek injunctive relief), cert. granted, vacated sub. nor. Chula Vista City School Dist.
v. Bennett, 474 U.S. 1098 (1986); Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621 (9th
Cir. 1979) (same).
137. United States v. City of Kansas City, 761 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1985) (no district court
jurisdiction for counterclaim against the United States where the purpose was to obtain previ-
ously denied grant money); New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318 (10th Cir. 1984) (same),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985).
138. The majority opinion alluded to one such case, Chula Vista City School District, in a
footnote. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 882 n.1 (1988).
139. The Bowen Court applied the alternative test devised by Judge Bork in Maryland
Department of Human Resources v. Department of Health & Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441
(D.C. Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR COURTS AND LITIGANTS
CONFRONTED WITH BOWEN
In the aftermath of Bowen, courts and litigants are left with several alter-
natives as they try to discern whether a suit should be brought under the
Tucker Act in the Claims Court or under the APA in district court. The
alternatives focus on damages, remedies, and restitution, respectively.
A. Applying a "Damages" Test
A "damages test" treats jurisdictional grants as mutually exclusive and
applies a damages definition to decide which forum is appropriate. This ap-
proach is dictated by the Bowen majority's reliance on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia's opinion in Maryland Department of Human
Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services. 141 In Human Re-
sources, Judge Bork rejected the Federal Government's argument that sec-
tion 702 of the APA barred a state's appeal from an order upholding a
Medicaid disallowance; section 702 referred to "actions seeking relief other
than money damages. "'42
Judge Bork did not apply the tests devised by the other circuits in their
attempts to distinguish between APA and Tucker Act suits."' Instead, he
concluded that the money sought by Maryland did not constitute a claim for
money damages because it was not "a sum of money used as compensatory
relief ... to substitute for a suffered loss.'" The money Maryland sought
was "funds to which a statute allegedly entitle[d] it, rather than money in
compensation for the losses ... that Maryland will suffer or has suffered by
virtue of the withholding of these funds."' 4 5
Judge Bork relied on Professor Dobbs' definition of the term "loss" in
classifying the types of remedies available as either substitutionary, i.e., com-
pensation for the loss, or specific, i.e., "giv[ing] the plaintiff the very thing to
140. Justice White's concurring opinion can be read as supporting a variant of this test
which might be called "the artful pleading" test:
The Court's opinion, as I understand it, also concludes that the District Court, in the
circumstances present here, would have had jurisdiction to entertain and expressly
grant a prayer for a money judgment against the United States. I am unprepared to
agree with this aspect of the opinion and hence concur only in the result the court
reaches with respect to the construction of § 702.
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 912; see Bowman, supra note 107, at 572.
141. 763 F.2d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) (emphasis added); Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763
F.2d at 1446.
143. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (for the other circuits' tests).
144. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1446 (citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135 (1973)).
145. Id. at 1446.
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which he was entitled."' 146 Judge Bork concluded, and the Bowen majority
apparently agreed, that when Congress employed the term "money dam-
ages" in section 702, it used the term in "the ordinary understanding of the
term as used in the common law for centuries."' 47 Judge Bork noted that
during the debate over the amendment, none of the legislators objected to
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. 's"'4 "classic distinction be-
tween the recovery of money damages and 'the recovery of specific property
or monies. '',149
Judge Bork's rationale for concluding that the Claims Court did not have
jurisdiction was as questionable as the Federal Government's argument that
the case had been tried in the wrong forum. The government's argument
was questionable because the Medicaid statute established two categories of
adverse agency action. First, a state might be sanctioned for noncompliance,
and if its appeal to the Departmental Grant Appeals Board failed, it could
appeal to the appropriate regional court of appeals.'30 Second, in less seri-
ous cases, a state's claim for reimbursement might be disallowed. Although
noncompliance sanctions could involve millions of dollars, the DOJ made no
effort to transfer jurisdiction over such cases to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit after the court's establishment in 1982. Further, states had,
in the quarter century of the Act's operation, routinely sought judicial re-
view in the appropriate district court despite the absence of a provision for
judicial review of disallowances in the Medicaid statute.15'
With respect to his rejection of Maryland's claim for money damages,
Judge Bork was presumably familiar with the traditional tripartite distinc-
tion of Tucker Act claims between those based on an express or an implied
contract, those based on the Constitution, and those based on a statute or
regulation. '52 If we apply these categories to his assertion that the money
146. Id. (quoting D. DOBBS, supra note 144, at 135). Remedies may be either legal or
equitable. Generally, legal remedies are compensatory rather than specific. D. DOBBS, supra
note 144, at 1-3. Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are often intended to grant specific
relief, although equity courts may also grant ancillary relief, in the form of damages, to accord
the suitor complete relief. Id.
147. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources 763 F.2d at 1447; Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 900-01 (1988).
148. 337 U.S. 682 (1948).
149. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1447 (quoting Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) (1988).
151. The Executive Branch's sole effort, claiming that the Act's silence dictated that there
should be no judicial review, failed in the mid-1970's. See County of Alameda v. Weinberger,
320 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir. 1975) (judicial review of agency action is not precluded absent a
persuasive reason to believe this to be the intent of Congress).
152. Eastport S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct., Cl. 1967).
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sought by the state was not intended as compensatory substitutionary relief,
then his comment must have related to the third category: suits based on a
statute or regulation. If his comments were limited to those based on a stat-
ute or regulation, however, then his reliance on a private, as opposed to
public, law definition of damages was inappropriate. Any Tucker Act suit
on a statute or regulation is a suit premised on an assertion of entitlement, a
public right, rather than a claim for compensation for losses, a private right.
"Loss," as Judge Bork used it, is a term without any legal meaning. Courts
usually use the term, however, in the context of contract suits, as a definition
of the claimant's expectancy or reliance interests-not for public law issues.
Judge Bork and the Bowen Court concluded that when section 702 was
amended to exclude suits for money damages Congress did not intend to
exclude statutory entitlement claims, because such claims were not for
losses, and Congress was aware of the Larson rule that specific relief could
entail the recovery of money. Surprisingly, neither Judge Bork nor the
Bowen majority referred to Professor Dobbs's work for elucidation on the
latter point. Had they done so, they would have discovered that replevin, a
legal remedy as distinguished from an equitable remedy, is never available
for specie. 3' Equity would never direct the return of money unless it was so
unique that it could be considered an irreplaceable chattel. Thus, any princi-
pled attempt to reconcile Bowen's reliance on Human Resources fails. Judge
Bork's criteria could be applied to all statutory entitlement cases, as they
were based on a misreading of private law which he then applied to construe
a public law provision. 54
153. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
154. In fact, Congress amended section 702 to permit district corts to exercise their juris-
diction to review "the legality of official conduct which adversely affects private persons."
H.R. REP. No. 1656 on S. 800 House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 4
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6121, 6125. This "withdraw[s]
the defense of sovereign immunity, in actions for injunctions, declaratory judgement and man-
damus." J. STEADMAN, D. SCHWARZ & S. JACOBY, supra note 71, at 331. But see Webster,
Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 734-44 n. 149 (believing that the authors
should have taken a more expansive view of the effect of section 702). For example, Sibley v.
Ball, 924 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1991), involved a marine officer's attempt to secure a declaratory
judgment that he had been unlawfully discharged. The Secretary of the Navy argued that the
effect of the officer's suit (which concurrently sought back pay) required that the claim be
processed under the Tucker Act. If the Court had followed Judge Bork's analysis, and Bowen,
it would have concluded that this was a suit for specific relief which simply entailed the recov-
ery of money and was not a claim for a "loss." In fact the Court, without reference to Bork or
Bowen, concluded that the Tucker Act did apply.
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B An Adequacy of Remedies Test
In the alternative, a district court faced with an APA suit for specific
relief, which, if granted, would result in payment of government monies,
could apply an adequacy of remedies test in deciding whether the suit was
actually a Tucker Act claim. Professor Webster favored this approach in his
provocative article, Beyond Sovereign Immunity: 5 US. C. § 702 Spells Re-
lief' 55 He correctly asserts that Congress intended section 702 to apply to
equitable forms of relief and the common law coercive writs.156 From that
premise, he correctly concludes that district courts should grant specific, as
distinguished from substitutionary, or monetary, relief only when there is no
adequate remedy at law, i.e., a Tucker Act suit. Webster, however, offers
little guidance as to appropriate criteria to apply in deciding when the
Tucker Act offers an adequate remedy; he simply states that "the courts now
agree that an alternative remedy is inadequate unless it is equally 'complete,
practical and efficient.' ,157 In fact, it has recently been suggested, by Pro-
fessor Laycock, on whom Professor Webster relies, that courts seeking to
exercise their equitable powers have consistently abused the "inadequacy of
remedy" test. 5 ' Thus, Professor Webster's case by case approach encour-
ages indeterminate outcomes-an unfavorable characteristic of the equitable
law suit in our view.I19
There are other objections to this approach as well. First, it puts a pre-
mium on the well-plead complaint,'" and second, the requested relief may
not be reconstrued as equivalent to damages. Instead, proof of adequacy
155. See Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 755.
156. Id, at 749. Surprisingly, Webster's remedies-based analysis does not focus on Judge
Bork's misuses of the Dobbs' treatise to prove that claims for disapproved grant-in-aid funds
were not claims for damages.
157. Id. at 750-51 & n.194 (quoting Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923)).
158. Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1990)
(failing to distinguish between private claims between individuals, and public law claims
against the government).
159. See Solum, USC Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1753 (1988). Solum articulates Aristotle's concept of equity: "No general
rule can guarantee the best outcome in all particular situations. Equity allows the judge to
dispense with the general rule in the particular case and reach a result. In modern legal par-
lance, we refer to the same idea as informed judicial discretion or equitable discretion." Id
(footnotes omitted) (citing THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1751 (J. Barnes ed. 1984)).
One scholar notes that this discretion allowed by equity is ripe for abuse. D. LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 14 (1991) (suggesting that "[o]rders to pay
money were sometimes available in equity, and courts and legislators sometimes use equitable
monetary relief to manipulate jurisdiction or avoid jury trial").
160. "The adequacy talisman requires the unthinkable of some courts: they must accept
the well pleaded prayer for nondamage relief of the complaint, entertaining it on its own
terms." Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 749 n. 185.
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must be required if the Claims Court remedy is to oust district court re-
lief, 6 ' thus elevating form over substance. 162
Webster acknowledges that his adequacy test would also, under some cir-
cumstances, lead to district court intervention in claims traditionally rele-
gated to the Claims Court-specifically, contract disputes and fifth
amendment takings claims.' 63 The most persuasive objection to Professor
Webster's approach is that he gives no hint as to how subordinate federal
courts, acting within the doctrine of stare decisis, could apply an "adequacy
test" while purportedly adhering to Bowen. Despite this criticism of his arti-
cle, however, he is the only Bowen commentator who has attempted to sug-
gest a judicial solution to the problems the case poses.
C A Restitutionary Test
A third test is to treat the jurisdictional grants as complimentary and ap-
ply a restitutionary test to decide which forum is appropriate. The language
in Bowen suggests this approach: "[n]either a disallowance decision, nor the
reversal of a disallowance decision, is properly characterized as an award of
'damages.' ,,164 Either decision is an adjustment. Indeed, decisions usually
order relatively minor adjustments in the size of the federal grant to the state
that is payable in huge quarterly installments. Congress uses the terms
"overpayment" and "underpayment" to describe such adjustments in the
open account between the United States and each state.165 Specific agency
action that reverses a disallowance decision is described as "restitution."'166
This approach is initially appealing because it enables subordinate courts
to limit the admittedly overbroad language of Bowen to those claims which
satisfy these criteria-relatively minor adjustments in claims due on open
accounts, and statutory uses of the term "restitution." Unfortunately, the
test suffers from two defects. First, it is unclear when a minor adjustment
161. Id. n.184.
162. Id.; see also Bowman, supra note 107, at 578. Bowman notes that:
[U]ntil the precise scope of the Bowen decision is clear, litigants may well be advised
to frame their pleading with care. It is probably wise, for example, to do the follow-
ing: (1) to seek an injunction against failure to reimburse, rather than to ask that the
district court order the federal government to pay a sum of money, (2) to avoid the
language of damages, (3) to emphasize the restitutionary nature of claims, where
possible, and (4) to highlight the prospective effect of the court's decision upon an
ongoing relationship with the federal government.
Id. at 578.
163. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 749. The Judicial
Conference of the United States would not view this consequence with equanimity.
164. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988).
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d) (1988).
166. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.
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would become "major" because it requires a comparison of two funds.16 7
Second, the use of the term "restitution" would encourage an activist court
to extend its section 702 equitable jurisdiction to claims for monetary relief
which courts have traditionally regarded as falling outside the Tucker Act's
waiver of sovereign immunity.'
6 1
The law of restitution "is the law relating to all claims, quasi-contractual
or otherwise, which are founded upon the principle of unjust enrich-
ment." 169  Litigants can alternatively seek relief on either legal grounds,
under a theory of quasi-contract, derived from Moses v. McFerlan 170 or on
equitable grounds, relying on the doctrines of constructive trust, subroga-
tion, or equitable lien. 17 1 Courts have traditionally excluded quasi-con-
tracts, contracts which are implied-in-law, from Tucker Act jurisdiction. 72
In particularly egregious cases, courts have "found" a contract implied-in-
fact, for example, to repay money wrongfully collected which in a private
law setting would have given rise to a contract implied-in-law or a tort
claim. 173 Professor Webster, who is generally supportive of increased dis-
trict court participation in traditional Tucker Act cases, seems troubled by
this possibility.' 74
To date, no one has considered the possibility that the Bowen Court's use
of the term "restitution" might be an invocation of the equitable doctrine of
constructive trust."7  Professor Street, in his magisterial work, GOVERN-
MENTAL LIABILITY, 1 76 touched on the possibility that the government could
167. For example, most government contract claims involve relatively minor adjustments
in the total contract price.
168. See supra text accompanying note 68 (noting that Tucker Act claims must be claims
for money damages).
169. R. GOFF, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 3 (3d ed. 1986).
170. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B. 1760) ("the gist of this kind of
action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity to refund the money").
171. R. GOFF, supra note 169, at 3, 4-5.
172. Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 341 (1925). But see Wall & Childres, The Law
of Restitution and the Federal Government, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (1971) (for several idiosyn-
cratic lower court decisions).
173. See, e.g., Clapp v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 576, (Ct. Cl. 1954) cert. denied, 348
U.S. 834 (1954); see also Boyd & Huffman, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-
Fact Contracts and Promissory Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U.L.
REV. 605, 606-09 (1991) (discussing jurisdiction of implied-in-law and implied-in-fact con-
tracts in the Claims Court).
174. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity, supra note 39, at 754-55 (misreading,
in our judgment, Eastport and Testan); see supra note 30 (for a discussion of Eastport).
175, R. GOFF, supra note 169, at 3.
176. H. STREET, supra note 2, at 129 (citing Mellon v. Orinoco Iron Co., 266 U.S. 121, 129
n.8 (1924)).
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be a trustee." In United States v. Mitchell, 78 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a particular statutory scheme might give rise to a fiduciary rela-
tionship. ' Although the Mitchell case was initiated in the Claims Court,
its trust doctrine, when combined with Bowen's expansive language permit-
ting restitutionary claims in district courts, unfortunately suggests the possi-
bility of a new class of claims.'go The Supreme Court's reliance on the
statutory term "restitution" should not be used to extrapolate some sort of
equitable restitutionary claim against the government.
V. THE PREFERRED SOLUTION: MAINTAINING CONSISTENCY
This Article is based on the premise, shared by other commentators,'81
that Bowen creates more forum selection problems than those it purports to
solve. Short of outright reversal, or corrective legislation, what can lower
courts do to mitigate its effect? We suggest that courts emphasize the pecu-
liar characteristics of Massachusetts's claim in Bowen and Maryland's claim
in Maryland Department of Human Resources,1" 2 and that Bowen's effect
should be limited to similar cases which involve grant-in-aid legislation.
Such suits can be distinguished from the normal Tucker Act case by examin-
ing the claimant and the nature of the claim, and then by examining the type
of relief sought.
A. The Nature of the Plaintiff and the Claim Advanced
The state in grant-in-aid cases is a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff,"' 3 and as such
is not the kind of claimant envisioned by the Tucker Act. States, however,
have standing to assert claims for reimbursement: 8 4  "non-Hohfeldian
plaintiffs invoke the judicial power to redress injuries not easily definable in
terms of personal, financial loss or other harms actionable at common
law."'' In Claims Court at the Crossroads, 186 Professor Fallon identifies
other characteristics as well, and he does not remark on the peculiar status
177. Id at 128.
178. 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell fl).
179. Id. at 226.
180. Id. at 226-27.
181. See Sisk, supra note 12, at 48-49; Sisk, Tucker Act Appeals to the Federal Circuit, 36
FED. B. NEWS & J. 41, 45-46 (1989); Webster, Choice of Forum, supra note 39, at 536-37.
182. 763 F.2d at 1441, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
183. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
184. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 885; see also County of Alameda v. Weinberger, 520 F.2d 344 (9th
Cir. 1975).
185. Fallon, supra note 14, at 4 (this is "[i]n contrast with the classic plaintiffs of American
legal history").
186. Fallon, supra note 12.
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of the state as plaintiff in Bowen. The authors of this Article do not claim
that he would agree with this Article's analysis. His article, however, suc-
cinctly identifies the non-Hohfeldian plaintiff-states seeking Medicare re-
imbursement meet that description. 8 7 Thus, the state's reimbursement
claims were not to "redress injuries definable in terms of personal, financial
loss.""18' Their "losses" were either lost opportunities to spend state reve-
nues for other purposes, while maintaining the controverted services, or, if
the service were curtailed or eliminated, the claimed loss would be the value
of the services which would otherwise have been rendered to the
beneficiaries.
The claim advanced in a state suit for reimbursement is unlike the tradi-
tional Tucker Act suit on a statute or regulation. State suits for reimburse-
ment neither assert that the United States has violated a statutory direction
to pay a specified sum,'8 9 nor do they assert that the statute "can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation to them by the federal government
for the damage sustained."'' Therefore, the majority decisions in Mary-
land Department of Human Resources and Bowen were right for the wrong
reasons: the state, as a claimant, had not sustained any "damage" as the
term is used in Tucker Act jurisprudence, these two decisions seemed to miss
this point, because of the peculiar nature of the state's "loss."' 9'
187. Id.
188. Fallon, supra note 14, at 4 (emphasis supplied).
189. See, e.g., Drier v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 888 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
190. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402 (1976) (citing Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United
States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. C1. 1967)) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Mitch-
ell, 463 U.S. 206, 211-19 (1983) (Mitchell II) (holding that the "Tucker Act provides the
United States' consent to suit for claims founded upon statutes or regulations that expressly or
implicitly create substantive rights to money damages"). Cf City of Alexandria v. United
States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in City
of Alexandria, suggested that the City had the same problem as the plaintiff in Eastport. Id. at
1028 (citing Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). Neither plaintiff could show that
money was illegally exacted or that any provision of law commanded payment. Thus, "not
every instance of misgovernment by a United States agency that is costly to private parties, or
local or state interests, generates a valid Tucker Act claim." City of Manassas Park v. United
States, 633 F.2d 181, 183, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
191. The Bowen Court's reliance on Judge Bork's decision caused the Court to base its
discussion of damages on a false premise-that suits to compel payments and reimbursements
were not suits for damages within the meaning of the Tucker Act because courts have always
distinguished "monetary ancillary relief" granted in equity from damages awarded in law.
Moreover, Justice Stevens and Judge Bork erroneously rely on Dobbs's comment that
"[o]ccassionally a money award is a specie remedy," Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895 (quoting Mary-
land Dep't of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1441,
1447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), and Larson's allusion to orders directing the "recovery of specific
property or monies." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp. 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)) (emphasis added). Both references related to those rare
cases where a court will treat specie as property and use its equitable powers to direct the
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The real distinction between the enforcement of a promise to pay money
and a statutory duty to do so is that in grant-in-aid cases, the money which
the beneficiary claims in the suit must be spent in a specified fashion and is
subject to federal audit to ensure compliance. In a typical "damages" suit,
the amount awarded, whether in a suit at law or as ancillary to an equitable
decree, is not subject to any similar restraints. Further, the amendment to
APA section 702 makes it clear that the drafters and scholarly commenta-
tors used "damages" in the traditional sense of an award of discretionary
funds-funds available for spending, unconstrained by federal limitations on
expenditures. '92 When a state or municipality sues the United States in con-
tract or tort, whether in law or equity, any award that it receives is not
subject to federal audit. Thus, a reimbursement claim is distinctive because
any such award is still subject to these same federal fiscal controls. This is
one of two ways in which courts can distinguish Bowen from other suits
involving federal funds.
B. The Nature of the Relief Sought
Courts can also examine the type of relief sought by the plaintiff to deter-
mine if the suit involves reimbursement. Justice Stevens and Judge Bork
correctly concluded that the courts in grant-in-aid cases were being called on
to exercise their equitable powers, rather than award money damages. Nev-
ertheless, they should have based their conclusion on the fact that grant-in-
aid suits effectively seek declaratory relief, establishing the eligibility of a
state program rather than federal reimbursement. Because the Tucker Act is
not a grant of jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions,193 the courts
return of identifiable funds. See Larson, 337 U.S. at 687 ("the area of controversy is entered
when the suit is not one for damages but for specific relief: i.e., the recovery of specific...
monies"); see generally D. DOBBS, supra note 144, at 421-22 (noting that "common law courts
took the position that an action of trover for conversion of money would not lie unless there
was an obligation to return some specific pieces of gold or the like").
Similarly, Judge Bork's reliance on private civil litigation concepts in Maryland Department
of Human Resources, failed to distinguish between the enforcement of a mere promise to pay
money and a statutory duty to do so. His obfuscation of the issue was apparent when he stated
that: "Maryland is seeking funds to which a statute allegedly entitles it, rather than money in
compensation for its losses . . . [thus permitting a district court to grant specific reliefi."
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895 (citing Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1441); see
also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 894-901; Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, 763 F.2d at 1446-48.
If Judge Bork's reasoning was correct, all Tucker Act suits on a statute or regulation in which
the suitors sought funds to which they were allegedly entitled would be suits for specific relief.
192. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
193. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("[C]ases seeking relief other than
money damages from the Court of Claims have never been 'within its jurisdiction.' "); see also
Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465 (1973) ("IThe Act has long been construed as au-
thorizing only actions for money judgments and not suits for equitable relief ... ").
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in Bowen and Maryland Department of Human Resources made two categor-
ical errors by failing to distinguish the nature of the plaintiff and the nature
of the relief sought.' 94
Grant-in-aid suits for reimbursement do not fit comfortably within the
Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction. Although the Claims Court has routinely
accepted such claims for money past due and owing, its jurisdictional basis is
questionable because the grant relationship shares the characteristics of both
a contract and a statutory entitlement.' 95 For example, in Kentucky ex rel.
Cabinet for Human Resources v. United States, 196 a recent Claims Court case
in which the State sought grant-in-aid reimbursements, the court requested
supplemental briefs in light of Bowen. 97 The State of Kentucky asserted
that jurisdiction was based on an express or implied contract, while the Fed-
eral Government submitted that the claim was based on a statute which
mandated payment.' 98 The court concluded that both grants of jurisdiction
applied although the opening sentences of its opinion asserted the traditional
view that the grants are mutually exclusive:
The Tucker Act provides four alternative foundations for claims
against the United States. The Claims Court may render judgment
on any claim founded "either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liqui-
dated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
199
194. A standard English administrative law treatise, which discusses declaratory proceed-
ings, makes the point clearly:
In some of the cases ... in which both parties to the declaratory action have been
public authorities, the issue could equally have arisen between private individuals, or
between a private individual and a public authority. But there are some classes of
disputes which arise exclusively or predominantly between public authorities and
which cannot be judicially determined except by means of a judgment in declaratory
form.... These include the financial contribution payable by a government depart-
ment to a local authority in respect of compensation .... The role of the declaratory
judgment as a means of resolving such issues is clearly very important.
J.M. EVANS, DE SMITH'S JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 496-97 (4th ed.
1980).
195. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 13-8 (1982) (distinguishing the contractual relationship
under a grant from a procurement contract). Id. at 13-9 (discussing the role of the Comptrol-
ler General in determining whether a particular expenditure is consistent with the intent of
Congress).
196. 16 Cl. Ct. 755 (1989).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 761.
199. Id. at 760-61 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)) (emphasis in original).
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Only grant-in-aid cases give rise to this confusion,2"° which is due in part to
the fact that, unlike most Tucker Act judgments, any sums awarded as reim-
bursement claims will not be drawn from the Judgment Fund20 ' but from
the specific monies appropriated by Congress to support the grant pro-
gram. 2  While the source of payment should not always be dispositive of
the question of Tucker Act jurisdiction, 2 3 Bowen's references to "ledger ad-
justment '"2' add weight to the conclusion that suits by states for grant-in-
aid reimbursement of moneys withheld are sui generis20 5 and are not claims
within the Tucker Act's jurisdiction. Thus, this Article conforms to the dic-
tates of Bowen, but returns to the practice which prevailed before the De-
partment of Justice began to make its creative arguments in section 702 cases
involving grants-in-aid. 2°
Return to the status quo would mean that grant-in-aid suits for prospec-
tive non-monetary relief would be brought in the district court. Appeals
would be taken to regional courts of appeal--even if the effect of the relief
would be to increase expenditures under the grant-in-aid program. This ap-
proach would be consistent with the goals of section 702,207 and, for exam-
ple, with the Medicaid statutory scheme which grants regional courts a role
in the review process. 208 Suits seeking both prospective non-monetary relief
and retrospective monetary relief would fall similarly within the district
courts' equitable jurisdiction, relying on the general doctrine that equity will
200. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 923 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing two
Claims Court grant cases, which gave "rise to enforceable obligations analogous to con-
tracts"); see, e.g., Missouri Health & Medical Org., Inc. v. United States, 641 F.2d 870, 873
(Ct. CI. 1981); Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 85, 89 (1985), aff'd, 802
F.2d 471 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
201. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
202. In such cases, the judgment is already provided for by congressional appropriations of
funds for the purpose of running the program. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
203. See Ford, Powell & Carson, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 200, 204 (1983) (require-
ment is not that appropriated funds have been used, but that the agency's authorizing legisla-
tion allows congressional appropriation of funds if necessary).
204. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 906-07; see also id. at 883-84 (discussing stream of revenue
adjustments).
205. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 906-07 (for Bowen's allusion to the unusual nature of the
State's interest implicated in such suits). "(The State's] interest in planning future programs for
groups such as the mentally retarded ... may be more pressing than the monetary amount in
dispute." Id. at 907.
206. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
207. "[Congress] intended ... [in] the Medicaid Act to provide merely a right, knowing
that the APA provided for a review of [disallowance actions]." Bowen, 487 U.S. at 906 n.42.
208. Id. at 908; see also Mason, supra note 117, at 15. "We sometimes give deference to an
administrative agency's interpretation of a statute. We should also give weight to an adminis-
trative agency's failure during a long history of its administration to advance a contention that
it now advances as representing the original intent of its Act." Id.
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afford complete relief,2" and that such orders are specific and not substitu-
tionary, as the terms were used in Bowen 210 We must emphasize that this
Article contends that the Bowen Court misapplied these terms, as did Judge
Bork.21 ' This Article's goal, however, is to rationalize Bowen, and it must,
therefore, utilize the language of the opinion. Moreover, this analysis as-
sumes that grant-in-aid cases are fundamentally different; therefore, the
analysis should not extend to other classes of claims where section 702 and
the Tucker Act may compete.21 2
Perhaps the most difficult category of claims is the suit for money past due
and owing under an ongoing grant program where the litigant seeks a judi-
cial declaration of eligibility to participate in a program. Bowen's emphasis
on congressional intent and the role of state law in disallowance actions, as
well as the "complex ongoing relationship between the parties" 213 simply
has no relevance to such a suit, which might be brought either as a Tucker
Act claim for money, or as a claim for specific relief, whether it be manda-
mus, injunction, or a declaratory judgment. Because this Article rejects any
interpretation of Bowen which assumes that the Court was creating a new
class of concurrent district court and Claims Court jurisdiction, it starts
from the premise that one court system or the other should have jurisdiction
over such claims. Bowen, by distinguishing Massachusetts v. Departmental
Grant Appeals Board,21 4 suggested that the Claims Court might continue to
hear retrospective suits for a "naked money judgment" '2 15 if the relief "is
unlikely to have any significant prospective effect upon the ongoing grant-in-
aid relationship between the [State] and the United States., 21 6 Most retro-
spective money judgments, however, will have a significant prospective effect
by virtue of the determination that a particular activity or function warrants
reimbursement and therefore should be treated as claims for prospective re-
lief, properly brought in a district court.2 17
209. See supra note 51 (referring to the equitable clean-up doctrine).
210. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 (1988).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206.
212. See, e.g., Cape Fox Corp. v. United States, 646 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1981) (action under
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act held to be properly before the district court for declara-
tory judgment, but the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over the damage claim).
213. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905.
214. 815 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1987).
215. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905.
216. Id. at 905 n.41 (quoting the concurring opinion in Grant Appeals Bd., 815 F.2d at
789).
217. Professor Bowman described the circumstances in Grant Appeals Board as "rare" be-
cause the challenged Medicaid expenditures were for abortions for which the state had been
paid pursuant to a court order pending resolution of a challenge to the Hyde Amendment.
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This Article urges courts to avoid the temptation to find "bare money,"
and thus Tucker Act claims, in suits involving grant-in-aid reimbursements.
In his Bowen dissent, Justice Scalia remarked that jurisdictional symmetry
has its virtues: "[n]othing is more wasteful than litigation about where to
litigate, particularly when the options are all courts within the same legal
system that will apply the same law." '218
VI. CONCLUSION
Bowen's reach should be limited to those suits where a state claims that
the Federal Government erred in ruling that a program was ineligible for
grant-in-aid reimbursement. Although the Medicaid statutes were poorly
drafted,2" 9 it is apparent that because Congress wanted non-compliance
cases to be heard by regional courts of appeals, it intended that disallowance
cases be heard by district courts. Courts should apply the same reasoning to
governmental suits seeking a determination of programmatic eligibility.
Thus, the circuit courts incorrectly decided United States v. City of Kan-
sas,22 Bakersfield City School District v. Boyer,"' Chula Vista City School
District v. Bennett,222 and Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals
Board 223 as Tucker Act cases. These cases were wrongly decided for three
reasons: first, any money which the plaintiffs received would not come from
the Judgment fund; second, any money received would be subject to federal
audit controls after award; and, finally, the recovery would only indirectly
benefit the "non-Hohfeldian plaintiff" who brought the suit.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Bowen lists the potential adverse consequences
of courts taking the majority's expansive language at face value. Because of
the glacial pace of most federal civil litigation, several years normally pass
before a case is heard on its merits, a decision is rendered, and the opinion is
reported. None of these predicted consequences will arise if our advice is
taken. Meanwhile, Bowen offers three salutary lessons: to the Department
of Justice when it is next tempted to deploy a novel jurisdictional argument;
to trial and appellate courts who accepted or rejected "Little Tucker Act"
arguments according to the terms set by litigants in lieu of independent anal-
Bowman, supra note 107, at 568. If the challenge failed, any ruling on the claim would be
entirely retrospective. Grant Appeals Bd., 815 F.2d at 784.
218. Bowen, 478 U.S. at 930 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 117, at 15 (characterizing the statute as "limping legisla-
tion" because of its unworkable distinction between noncompliance and disallowance cases
and because of its failure to address court review in disallowance cases).
220. 761 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1985).
221. 610 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1979).
222. 824 F.2d 1573, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988).
223. 815 F.2d 778 (lst Cir. 1987).
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ysis; and finally, to law faculties who, by failing to teach students the differ-
ence between public and private law, and between legal and equitable
remedies, facilitated mistakes that would never have been made a generation
ago.
